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ABSTRACT 
The management of explosions in the underground mining environment has been a high priority for managers since the turn 
of the century. In the early 1900s explosions, worldwide, reached catastrophic dimensions. In a number of large explosions 
more than 1000 people have died. 
In the early years of research, the basics of why explosions occurred were investigated and the participation of coal dust 
in underground coal mine explosions was proved. Taffanel, a French researcher, was one of the pioneers in establishing the 
use of stone dust and was instrumental in the design and development of the first stone-dust barriers. Throughout the cen-
tury, research on explosions has continued in different parts of the world. 
Since explosions still occur in underground coal mines, as recent events in the Ukraine have illustrated, a certain problem 
area still exists. This area can be regarded as managerial. This paper gives an overview of the progress made by manage-
ment in implementing explosion-prevention strategies and presents a new approach to explosion management in terms of an 
explosion. management model, based on sound risk management principles. These principles allow the manager to close the 
loop in normal explosion management by focusing on all aspects of risk. Including auditing and monitoring to adequately 
address and manage the residual risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The possibility of an explosion in a coal mine can never be 
completely excluded as the very nature of the material and 
the methods employed to extract it always leaves open the 
potential for an ignition. With the attention currently given 
to the prevention of explosions the probability of one occur-
ring in a mine is very low. However, unfortunately the 
probability is significantly higher that when an explosion 
does occur, it will cause serious damage. In the event of an 
explosion, such as the 1993 Middelbult accident in which 
~3 people lost their lives, the risk associated with it and the 
Influence/effect on the community are not measurable. 
A recent study by Phillips ( 1995) summarized the occur-
rence of coal mine explosions in South Africa during the 
past decade. He listed 11 explosions, which led to 136 fa-
talities. If these figures were to be coupled with explosions 
throughout the world during the same period, it would un-
doubtedly indicate that although not that frequent in modem 
day coal mining, the risk of a catastrophic event is still very 
real. 
Significant amounts of effort and research worldwide 
have been directed at investigating the occurrence, preven-
tion and minimization of the effects of explosions in the 
underground coal environment. Indeed, research has been 
so extensive that it is doubtful whether anybody could claim 
ignorance with regard to the causes or the methods of pre-
venting explosions. Nevertheless, explosions still occur and 
do still cause a great loss of life and property. 
The question that needs to be answered is why after all 
the effort in research and the investment by mines in pre-
ventative methods, do these explosions still happen and 
what can be done to reduce such incidents even further.-
Although various models for preventing explosions have 
been proposed and used in mines, situations still occur that 
lead to the components of an explosion being present. 
Whether the explosion is only an insignificant ignition or a 
catastrophic event ultimately depends not on the mine's 
ability to prevent the ignition, but on the precautions the 
mine has taken to either suppress or contain the explosion. 
Throughout the Western World these suppression meth-
ods and procedures are mostly prescribed by law as are the 
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legal safety requirements and the precautions that have to be 
taken to prevent ignitions from occurring. This paper ad-
dresses those aspects that are not fully prescribed by the law 
and that could lead to an increase in the probability of an 
ignition or explosion occurring. Attention is given to proc-
esses in which the relationships between the causes and the 
results are less clear but which are deemed as important if 
not of overriding importance in the quest for the complete 
elimination of explosions. 
BACKGROUND 
Various models for action to prevent explosions from occur-
ring have been proposed. Michelis ( 1991) developed a clas-
sic model of explosion-protection controls in coal mining. 
These controls are shown in Figure 1 and were presented in 
detail by DuPlessis, 1996. 
Further models to prevent explosions or ignitions from 
occurring have been proposed by other authors. In some 
cases these models are based on where the explosion could 
occur (in the face or in the goaf area) or, in the majority of 
cases, on which methods of prevention are followed. 
Notwithstanding whatever model or strategy is followed, 
the underlying principle is to prevent an ignition and subse-
quent explosion by preventing the explosive triangle from 
occurring. When an explosion does occur, it is prevented 
from reaching significant or catastrophic proportions 
through the use of either suppression or containment meth-
ods. The final aspect of safeguarding workers is to establish 
methods that could assist them in the aftermath of an explo-
sion. 
Latterly there has been a tendency to promote a safe 
working environment through the use of risk assessment 
and management techniques. Risk assessment as part of 
mining practice is prescribed by the South African Mine 
Health and Safety Act, 1991, and regulations. 
In South Africa a certain process of hazard control is 
customarily followed. The normal process entails a work-
ing group setting up guidelines. A typical relevant example 
is the guidelines for explosion prevention drawn up in 1997. 
It then becomes the responsibility of the various mining 
houses to devise a code of practice according to the guide-
lines set. Once completed, this is submitted to the Depart-
ment of Minerals and Energy (DME) for approval. Once 
approved, these codes of practice, and the standards flowing 
from them, can be enforced as if they were part of the 
regulations themselves. Enforcement of compliance with 
these standards is the responsibility of the DME. 
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of explosion risk is not always ensured as management feels 
it has fulfilled its obligations once the code of practice has 
been completed. It is as if once the risk has been assessed 
and processes to cope with it has been formulated, the risk 
is under control. This may be due to the relatively short 
period over which risk assessment is done in the mining 
process because in reality success is achieved only through 
continued risk control and hazard management. 
For the control of explosions to be successful, a revised 
and expanded explosion-management process is therefore 
proposed. This is considered necessary as the process pres-
ently used to develop a code of practice centre entirely on 
controls and the so-called "hard aspects". In practice, fail-
ures are more often ascribable to the "softer aspects", i.e. 
the influence of human error on the process. The interac-
tion between the human aspect and the physical control 
measures must be taken into account in the development of 
an explosion-prevention strategy and the control processes 
that are established. In order to accommodate some of these 
more fuzzy aspects, additional processes are proposed. 
EXPLOSION MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
The classic risk management process follows a certain se-
quence: 
) Identification of the potential hazards, the scope of the 
control measures and the shortcomings 
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) Evaluation of the risk and the effectiveness of the con-
trols 
) Implementation of measures to manage the residual risk 
) Measurement and auditing of the residual risk. 
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Figure 2. Risk management process. 
Controlling the risk is not the only process involved in 
risk assessment but it requires the discipline of adhering to , 
the required implementation and maintenance of the control 
measures identified through the risk assessment. 
Even when these engineering controls have been imple-
mented and successfully used there is still a residual risk of 
a methane explosion occurring. In previous work done at 
Miningtek by Oberholzer and de Kock (Personal communi-
cations, 1998) it was found that in many cases the occur-
rence of a hazard was mainly due to the inability of the in-
stalled system to cope with changes in the environment. For 
example, the installed systems could not stop the mining 
process in the event of such an increase in methane inflow 
that the normal ventilation could not cope with it. 
In formulating a solution, an addition to the normal pro-
cess of risk assessment was proposed. Based on the theory 
that an increase in the rate of changes in the environment 
would lead to a commensurate increase in the risk of a haz-
ard occurring, a process of "Check For Changes" was pro-
posed. 
In this process use was to be made of inputs from not 
only the section but also the external physical environment. 
Any change taking place at an increased rate would be a 
flag to indicate the potential for a hazard occurring. If the 
increase in the rate of change was so great that the operation 
of the section was to be stopped, the workers withdrawn and 
an investigation started, that would prove that the risks in-
volved were still under control or would indicate which 
actions had to be taken to rectify the dangerous situation. 
As this process lends itself to the science of neural net-
works, work was initiated to allow the information to be 
gathered telemetrically and adjudicated by means of a neu-
ral net on a computer linked to the mine's communication 
system. 
These developments unfortunately only addressed the 
ambit of engineering controls in terms of their classic defi-
nition. Using the components of control, standard setting, 
measuring, quantification of the deviation, defming the 
cause of the variation and fmally implementation of the 
rectifying step, as a basis, it is possible to develop regulated 
processes. When the risk of an explosion is simplified by 
using the principle of a fixed consequence, then all attention 
can be spent on reducing the probability of occurrence. In 
preventing the occurrence of an explosion, the consequence 
that is guarded against is confmed simply to that of an igni-
tion occurring. As an ignition can only occur when all the 
components of the fiery triangle are present, the risk as-
sessment management processes and engineering controls 
are focused purely on preventing the occurrence of the three 
components. 
Attention is then given to ensuring that no fuel in the 
form of methane is present through the design and control 
of the ventilation system. The second aspect to which atten-
tion is directed is to prevent sufficient forms of energy be-
ing present to form the initiating heat needed for the igni-
tion. This can take many forms but will usually involve as-
pects such as flame-proofmg, cutters, rotational speeds, wet 
cutter heads, etc. The control of these aspects is relatively 
simple as precise measurement criteria for compliance can 
be developed. 
There are, however, shortcomings in using such a strat-
egy as it does not cater for things not going according to 
plan and an ignition occurring. To cater for this eventuality, 
the risk to workers and the mine investment is reduced by 
installing further engineering controls that reduce or sup-
press the effects of ignitions. By maintaining the required 
amount of stone dust in the working, the effects of a meth-
ane explosion can be contained or the controls can even be 
expanded by using on-board suppression systems that will 
contain the explosion purely to the front of the machine that 
extracts the coal. These measures can easily be controlled, 
as there are well-defmed standards according to which they 
should be applied. 
Even though these methods and the standards required 
for safe operation are widely known and legislated, acci-
dents still occur. After investigating the causes of these ac-
cidents in an environment in which all the safety rules are 
supposed to be known and implemented, the researchers 
became aware of the increased importance of the softer and 
less defmed aspects of the risk management process. 
The whole process can be illustrated by examining the 
constant monitoring of methane on a continuous heading 
machine. Such monitoring is regarded as critical in ensur-
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ing that there is not sufficient fuel present if a machine 
should cut into stone and cause a frictional ignition. 
It is common practice in South Africa and throughout 
the world for continuous heading machines to be equipped 
with a continuous methane monitor. This equipment is de-
signed to give an alarm signal at a preset concentration of 
between 0.7% and 1% CH4 per volume and is linked to the 
cutter motor to trip the machine out at 1.4% CH4• However, 
the mere fact that this control is on the machine, and that 
standards for its maintenance and calibration have been 
drawn up will not reduce the risk of an ignition. 
Recently (Du Plessis, 1997) two methane explosions oc-
curred in headings after the monitoring device had been 
disconnected because the machine kept tripping out, thereby 
impeding production by the machine. These were not iso-
lated incidents, but occur throughout the mining world 
where there are production pressures. From this example it 
is evident that there is a flaw in many of the presently used 
risk assessment and management processes. Even though 
aspects like auditing, monitoring and proper training of the 
prescribed processes are attended to, there is still no assur-
ance that the controls are being implemented or that the risk 
is within acceptable limits. The example further indicates 
that the mere presence of a resource does not mean that it is 
being applied in the correct manner. 
The failure of any of the installed systems to cope ade-
quately with controlling the explosion hazard can be as-
cribed to two main reasons; the failure of the engineer-ing 
system to cope with the impending hazard; or the failure of 
the human part of the system to cope with the impending 
hazard. Both of the above fall within the ambit of manage-
ment so that it could be stated that explosions occur due to a 
failure of the management system. It can, however, be fur-
ther argued that if the process or system had been audited 
and the shortcomings identified, the necessity for remedial 
actions such as training or even further engineering controls 
would have been pinpointed. From the essential questions 
that need to be answered during an auditing process, like: 
Are the current controls practical, known to be adequate, 
acceptable, enforced, understood, effective, available, ac-
cessible, approved and used?, management would have 
been able to address these shortcomings. 
It can be safely assumed that there is no mine manager 
who would not try his utmost, within the resources under 
his control to completely stop explosions from occurring. In 
an effort to understand the reasons why management sys-
tems established by well-motivated and responsible people 
still fail, Oberholzer (1998) developed a model that could be 
used to evaluate a higher level of risk which would also 
encompasses managerial action. 
To allow visualization and for ease of explanation, the 
model is represented by a beam with a weight on each side of 
a fulcrum, thereby forming a balance of moments. The beam 
itself has no weight. When the internal system copes with the 
impacts of the environment, the beam is in a state of 
equilibrium (balance) as presented in Figure 3. 
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The weight on the working environment side of the beam 
represents the requirements of the environment from the 
system. 
The position of this weight on the beam represents the 
way that the requirements are presented to the system. J.be 
weight on the opposite side of the beam represents the coping 
capacity of this system which is determined by the sum of all 
the resources required to cope with the environmental 
requirements. The capacity will be made up of the following 
resources: 
- Fit-for-purpose equipment 
- Competently trained staff 
- Adequate or suitable policies and procedures. 
The position of the weight on the system side of the beam 
represents the way the resources are deployed. The 
deployment is indicative of how the resources are managed 
with the focus more on the effectiveness than on the amount 
of effort expended. 
Both sides of the beam represent the internal environment, 
including resources and requirements. The impacts on this 
environment arise from outside this balanced system. 
How the beam will respond to disturbances from the 
external environment depends on the way the weights are 
positioned and on their size. If the weights are close to the 
centre, the beam becomes less stable, whereas if the distances 
at which the weights are positioned are increased, an increase 
in stability is achieved. The larger the weights, the large·r the 
impact required to start moving the beam as a result · of its 
internal inertia. The inertia can also be increased by 
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extending the distances outward without increasing the size of 
the weights. 
Some practical considerations had to be incorporated into 
the model to make its working represent reality more closely. 
It can safely be assumed that no organization will expend and 
deploy more resources than are required by the environment 
at a specific point in time. Even if a situation has excess 
capacity, it will only be used when the system requires it. 
This requires the model to have a built-in constraint that will 
stop it from becoming unbalanced due to the presence of 
over-capacity. The model was therefore expanded to include 
this built-in constraint, as shown in Figure 4. 
System Working environment 
-- --- ----- ------ ------------ ------- --· ::··-- -------- -------- --- --- ----------- ---- -. 
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Capacity and requirerrents in a state of balance 
Figure 4. Adapted model with built in constraint. 
Due to this constraint, the excess capacity will cause an 
unbalanced situation and will have to be brought into action 
before it can have an effect. Spare or excess capacity re-
sources are thus not a safety margin, unless the processes to 
bring them into speedy or almost immediate effect exist. On 
the other hand, negative deployment actions or the lack of 
sufficient capacity will cause the beam to become unbalanced. 
Negative actions, no matter how small, can cause a state 
of disequilibrium, while a positive deployment could mean 
that the system can cope with larger environmental require-
ments, without incurring the additional costs that accompany 
increased capacity. 
USING THE MODEL FOR SOLUTIONS 
The purpose of the model is not only to create greater 
understanding but also to enable more focused and effective 
solutions to be formulated. 
Using the outcome from risk identification and assessment 
processes, the underlying causes and the manner in which 
they influence the various components of the overall system 
can be determined. Applying the model now allows the 
drawing up of risk management plans that address the 
underlying problems and causes. 
To stop a balanced beam from collapsing after an impact, 
use can be made of mechanisms that brake or dampen the 
initial movement, thereby giving the system time to rectify the 
inbalance. By installing an arresting mechanism, the beam is 
allowed to go marginally out of balance but is then stopped 
from going further. Using this principle, methods can be 
devised to allow the mine time to bring spare capacity into 
play in the event of an impact. 
This method is presently being used as the basis for 
developing the Explosive Risk Index measurement system. 
Based on the "Check for Changes" method where the rate of 
change indicates the risk, the system measures various in-
section and external parameters. By using neural network 
technology, an overall risk is calculated. In the work 
currently being conducted, the probability of a methane 
ignition occurring is determined. If this probability exceeds a 
certain limit then an emergency situation declared all work in 
the section is stopped and the workers are withdrawn. 
This is done without considering the causes or reasons. 
Only when the rates of change have stabilized may work 
recommence and is an investigation into the causes initiated. 
Although this system is presently focused on the more 
visible and dramatic occurrence of underground explosions, it 
is anticipated that once the system is functioning 
satisfactorily, it could be expanded to encompass the Iess 
visible aspects of worker health, like dust, heat and noise 
exposure. 
In combating the effects of preventable impacts that are 
caused by management actions, the solutions are as yet not so 
evident. One possible method is to create an increased 
resistance to negative changes through management 
deployment. This is an area that is fully in the ambit of the 
managerial sciences that will have to be relied on to provide 
solutions. 
Another possible method is to increase the deployment of 
the capacity, thereby creating excess capacity. The 
empowerment of workers, increased awareness and training 
in the right aspects should be beneficial. 
The whole area of capacity deployment appears, however, 
to be the one that is the least understood, yet it is this area that 
can make the greatest contribution. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Th~ process of managing the risk of underground explo-
sions, even though it is familiar, is not as simple as it is gen-
erally believed to be. Apart from the engineering controls, 
aspects like the human factor and management influence 
play a significant role. 
At present, there are very few processes that incorporate 
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the human role or the management role into the risk assess-
ment and management process. 
Apart from a fundamentally well-designed engineering 
control process, there should also be methods for auditing 
implementation and using the controls. As the probability of 
a hazard occurring is directly proportional to the period of 
time that the control system cannot cope, auditing systems 
should also encompass changing conditions, trends and 
rates. 
These auditing processes should become an integral part 
of the overall risk management system. The necessary ac-
tions indicated by changes in the system should be imple-
mented both in terms of the resources that are allocated and 
the way in which these resources are applied. This means 
that risk management is a dynamic process and not simply a 
set of guidelines or a checklist for solving risk-related is-
sues. As knowledge is gained, and newer and better meth-
ods and technologies are developed for use as engineering 
controls, so the process must be reviewed and adapted by 
management in order to remain relevant and effective. 
The best practices in the world cannot alone eliminate 
the explosion risk since the occurrence of an explosion is 
ultimately determined by how man has influenced his envi-
ronment. Man, being both the strong and the weak link in 
the chain of occurrences, ultimately controls the safety of 
his environment. A process of management that reduces the 
negative influence of man, supports and advances his posi-
tive contributions and at the same time provides increased 
effectiveness of the preventative controls, should be the 
ultimate aim of a. risk management strategy. 
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